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CONSTITUTIONAL/LAND USE—SMALL-TOWN POLITICS, BIG-TIME
PROBLEM: ADDRESSING THE DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS OF EX PARTE
COMMUNICATIONS IN QUASI-JUDICIAL MUNICIPAL PROCEEDINGS
Ryan K. O’Hara*
Town residents and politicians stand at odds over the conversion of a
driving range and ice cream shop—a local favorite—into a big-box
supermarket. The town zoning board’s decision on an appeal of the
store’s permit will determine the practical fate of a neighborhood, and
the metaphorical fate of the town. The supermarket, during an appeal
of its granted permit, brings in new “local counsel,” an attorneypolitician who ultimately meets with four of five zoning board
members individually, in-person. He claims these meetings were
merely to discuss “procedural questions.” Circumstantial evidence
suggests otherwise. Upon judicial review of the board’s affirming the
permit on appeal, the trial judge finds that bias played no role in the
board’s decision, yet articulates no standard for when a finding of
bias should be made in such circumstances.
These facts are drawn from a real situation, and similar situations
occur in different factual settings before municipal boards. Despite
this, Massachusetts (along with roughly forty-five other states) has no
established law governing the effect of such ex parte communications
on those quasi-judicial proceedings, a constitutional issue of due
process.
Four other jurisdictions—Florida, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington—
have addressed this problem, each reaching a different resolution.
Idaho has a rule implying that undisclosed ex parte communications
made to municipal boards in quasi-judicial settings are fatal to the
outcome of the proceedings. A Washington statute requires disclosure
to avoid nullification. Florida imputed a presumption of bias onto ex
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University, 2013. I am deeply grateful to Mark Tanner, Esq., for his assistance in identifying
and developing this topic, as well as for personal and professional guidance. Special thanks are
also owed to Professor Julie Steiner for her invaluable work in shaping this piece as a mentor,
editor, and motivator. I would like to thank the staff of the Western New England Law Review
for their efforts in producing this piece over the last year-and-a-half. Most importantly, endless
love and thanks to my family—particularly my siblings, Kathryn and John O’Hara, my parents,
Laura and Drew O’Hara, and my grandmother, Jeannine Cole Pease—and close friends for
making this, and everything else, possible.
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parte communications, whereas Oregon takes the approach that no
such presumption results from such communications.
This Note describes the issue presented by ex parte communications
in the municipal context; identifies the current rules and approaches
adopted by jurisdictions that have addressed this issue, weighing their
various strengths and weaknesses; and considers what guidance
federal administrative law can provide. Ultimately, it synthesizes,
proposes, and justifies a model rule for jurisdictions that have not yet
addressed this issue: a rebuttable presumption of bias, curable by
disclosure on the record.

“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants . . . .”
– Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis1
INTRODUCTION
Often, some of the most pressing legal matters faced by American
citizens take place outside of the courtroom, in both formal and informal
interactions with municipal government. Prospective tavern keepers must
go before municipal licensing boards to obtain hotly contested liquor
licenses;2 landowners must consult local zoning and planning boards
regarding the use of their property;3 and new construction must be
approved under both state-based administrative safety regulations and
permitting processes within individual municipalities that enforce those
regulations.4
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution guarantees the state cannot deprive a citizen of property or
liberty without due process of the law5—how do these protections
manifest in the less formal circumstances presented by municipal
administration?

1. Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WKLY, Dec. 20, 1913, at 10,
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f4405e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45 r81.cf1 rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1910/
1913_12_20_What_Publicity_Ca.pdf [https://perma.cc/LC2L-44PG].
2. See, e.g., Mary Serreze, Easthampton City Council Delays Vote on Seeking 8 OverQuota
Liquor
Licenses,
MASSLIVE.COM
(Oct.
22,
2015),
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2015/10/easthampton_over_quota_liquor_licenses ht
ml [https://perma.cc/3HEL-M7VK].
3. See, e.g., Mary Serreze, Crowd Turns Out to Support Fort Hill Brewery at
Easthampton Zoning Board Hearing, MASSLIVE.COM (Oct. 9, 2015, 6:00 AM),
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2015/10/tcrowd_turns_out_to_support_for html
[https://perma.cc/44TN-NGEQ].
4. See generally, e.g., Mass. State Sanitary Code, 105 MASS. CODE REGS. 410 (2016).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Consider the following scenario:6 a big-box supermarket is intent on
developing a new location in a small city.7 This new store will be placed
on land that is currently the site of a soft-serve ice cream shop and driving
range, a local favorite with a beautiful view of a mountain and church
steeples.8
The supermarket applies to the town zoning board of appeals
(“ZBA”) for a special permit.9 However, the community fears that the
new store would push out smaller businesses, create further traffic snarls
in an already congested area, and replace a favorite local institution; these
fears threaten to derail the permitting process.10 In response, the
supermarket brings in a local attorney-politician, who contacts ZBA
members, shows them plans and gets to know them personally.11
Ultimately, the permit is denied in a split decision; however, the attorney
participates in the drafting of the decision to give it a greater chance of
success on appeal, via communication with the head of the ZBA.12
When the denial of the special permit is appealed, the local counsel
continues to meet personally with most members of the ZBA, despite
being rebuffed by some.13 In some instances, he travels over forty-five
minutes each way to meet with the members;14 in others, he calls them

6. The scenario is derived from the facts plead in the plaintiff’s opposition to summary
judgment in Cernak v. Planning Board for the City of Easthampton, a Massachusetts trial court
case. See Pls. Mem. of Law in Opp. to Defs. Motion for Summary Judgment, Cernak v.
Planning Bd. for the City of Easthampton, No. 10-035 (Mass. Super. Ct. Hampshire Cty., Mar.
26, 2013) (on file with author) (hereinafter “Cernak Memorandum”). While the facts, then, are
necessarily those most favorable to the plaintiff, they are presented at face value here to illustrate
the issue in its most vivid form.
7. Id. at *1.
8. See Mary Serreze, Stop & Shop, Tasty Top Owner, Mum on Supermarket Project in
Easthampton,
MASSLIVE.COM
(Oct.
16,
2014),
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2014/10/tasty_top_owner_and_stop_shop html
[https://perma.cc/QF7V-FLC5].
9. See Cernak Memorandum, supra note 6, at *1.
10. See John Paradis, Get Tasty Top Treat While You Can, DAILY HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE
(June
12,
2014),
http://www.gazettenet.com/Archives/2014/06/paradis-hg-061314
[https://perma.cc/3VWB-6BU2]. Paradis’s editorial, albeit penned several years after the initial
permit was granted, eloquently articulates the common anti-Stop & Shop sentiment, writing
about sprawl and classic New England charm:
What I lament is that when the Tasty Top and its cool cone sign comes down, a
piece of New England will come down with it . . . . Easthampton has a beautiful
mountain backdrop, old mills as well as a revitalized and repurposed mill, a
downtown with character and attractive specialty stores, a bike trail, and a prep
school. What it won’t have now is an ice cream stand.
Id.
11. See Cernak Memorandum, supra note 6, at *2.
12. Id. at *7–11.
13. See id. at *17–26.
14. Id. at *18.
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both at their offices and on their personal phones.15 When members do
meet with the attorney, they comment on alternative plans offered by
him.16 The attorney hopes that these conversations will help “make sure
that the message . . . is clear” and “assist[] the Planning Board in making
a decision.”17
Throughout the process, the existence of these communications
remains unknown to those opposing the permit.18 After the ZBA reverses
its original decision and grants a special permit, abutters of the property—
suspicious of impropriety in the process—sue for judicial review of the
ZBA’s decision.19 Through discovery, the plaintiffs learn of the
communications described above.20
Naturally, all members of the ZBA deny any prejudice resulting from
the communications.21 Some indicate they refused to meet with the
attorney at all, uncomfortable with the unprecedented (for this ZBA, at
least) situation.22 The supermarket and its attorneys maintain that the local
counsel’s conversations were merely limited to procedural questions,
despite a professional town planner designated as the sole point of contact
between the ZBA and interested parties.23
What recourse do the parcel’s aggrieved neighbors have? When
does lobbying—a fact of municipal life—become improper, or unduly
influential? What effect does the supermarket’s persistent and pervasive
pattern of ex parte influence have on the judicial validity of the ZBA’s
decision? If the ZBA flatly denies it was influenced by these ex parte
communications, how can a litigant successfully demonstrate bias? These
are not questions with easy answers. Given the Constitution’s promise of
due process,24 however, they must be answered.
Ex parte communications in such settings—by definition, those
outside of official procedure25—present serious issues under the
constitutional mandate for due process,26 and dangerous potential for
15. Id. at *17–26.
16. Id.
17. Id. at *18 (internal citation omitted).
18. See id. at *2.
19. See generally Pls. Complaint, Cernak v. Planning Bd. for the City of Easthampton,
No. 10-035 (Mass. Super. Ct. Hampshire Cty., Mar. 26, 2013) (on file with author).
20. See Cernak Memorandum, supra note 6, at *2.
21. See id. at *20–23. The board members do not, however, contest that the
communications occurred. See id. at *24.
22. Id. at *20–21.
23. Id. at *22.
24. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
25. Ex parte, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Done or made at the instance
and for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or argument by, anyone having an
adverse interest.”).
26. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also infra Part II.
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improper influence and moral hazards for practitioners and parties alike.27
These questions must be addressed in order to ensure stakeholders’ rights
and clearly delineate obligations for those conducting the day-to-day work
of municipal law. As a fundamentally local issue, this can only be done
on the state level.28
Very few jurisdictions have provided solutions to this problem: only
Massachusetts, Oregon, Idaho, Washington, and Florida have had
opportunities to squarely address it, reaching divergent answers.29 The
federal administrative context, an environment in which many of the same
issues arise, may provide some indication of a solution.30
Ideally, to resolve this issue, board members facing circumstances
such as those described above should cure the hazards presented by
improper contacts by disclosing the existence and content of any ex parte
communications, and providing parties the chance to contest and rebut on
the official record any arguments advanced in those communications.
However, where board members engage in ex parte communications, yet
fail to publicly disclose them, their decision should automatically be
rendered suspect and infected by bias—a presumption they can then rebut.
This Note will first provide a brief overview of municipal
government, including the powers it is given and the structure by which it
administers those powers. It will then turn in Part II to the constitutional
issues raised in the context of those structures, depending on the type of
power being exercised. In Part III, this Note discusses the specific
procedural and substantive issues posed by ex parte communications in
municipal administrative context. Part IV addresses what jurisdictions
have done to resolve the issue, and the successes and failures of those
solutions. The Note then turns to federal administrative law for insight in
Part V, discussing that body of law in conjunction and comparison with
the state law examined in Part IV. Finally, in Part VI, this Note proposes
a model solution of this issue for any jurisdiction that may encounter it,
synthesizing all prior proposed solutions to create a rule that balances
fundamental fairness with the realities of the municipal context.
I.

MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY: SOURCE AND STRUCTURE

Before addressing the constitutional problems that may arise when
ex parte communications are made to municipal decision-making bodies,

27. See infra Part III.
28. See discussion infra Part I. While the federal context is not totally irrelevant; see
Part V infra; a national framework is an impossibility, as it would impermissibly intrude on the
police powers reserved for states and their municipal bodies.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See infra Part V.
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it is critical to briefly sketch out the municipal context. Municipal
governments are a special type of corporation, and, accordingly, are
exclusively creatures of state law.31 They “have no sovereign power.
Instead, they enjoy only the powers conferred on them by state
constitutions and statutes.”32 Municipalities may take many different
forms—from autocratic mayors, to strong councils, to town meetings—
and the choice of form is left solely with the municipal government.33 The
prevalent forms of municipal governance vary greatly between
jurisdictions.34
The powers of the municipal corporation are bound most narrowly
by the municipality’s charter.35 The charter—when duly authorized by
state law—is the source of all of a municipality’s power, defining and
limiting its form and bounds.36 Charters can be understood as the
municipal analogues to a constitution, although their creation must first be
permitted by the relevant state law.37
Typically, the charter will vest two types of powers in the municipal
legislature: legislative and administrative.38 Legislative power is the
authority to create law, whereas administrative power is the authority to
enforce law.39 The classic test for distinguishing between the two involves
examining whether the municipal action in question (often an ordinance)
makes new law, or merely executes existing law.40
Municipalities have authority to legislate on matters traditionally
within the state’s reserved police powers—namely health, safety, welfare,
and morals.41 The police powers have been held to provide sufficient
grounds for zoning legislation.42 However, most jurisdictions’ state
legislatures explicitly provide municipalities with the authority to zone in

31. See 2A MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 10:3 (3d ed. 2016) (discussing sources of
municipal power, including state constitutions, statutes, and municipal charters, inter alia).
32. STEWART E. STERK & EDUARDO M. PENALVER, LAND USE REGULATION 18 (2011).
33. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 31, § 9:14.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Alvord Inv., LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Stamford, 920 A.2d 1000,
1011 (Conn. 2007) (“The charter serves as an enabling act, both creating power and prescribing
the form in which it must be exercised.”).
36. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 31, § 9:3.
37. Id.
38. See id. § 10.6.
39. Id. For more nuanced, in-depth treatment of these separate categories of municipal
power, see discussion infra Section II.B.
40. See, e.g., Whitbeck v. Funk, 12 P.2d 1019, 1019 (Or. 1932); see also MCQUILLIN,
supra note 31, § 10:6.
41. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386–87 (1926).
42. Id. at 395 (holding that particular zoning measures were sufficiently justified by
reason of health, safety, and welfare).

2017]

MUNICIPAL PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

107

zoning enabling acts (“ZEA”).43 Once a municipal government
legislatively enacts zoning standards, it must also administrate the laws—
often this is done by delegation to a zoning-specific authority.44
As a broad rule, delegation of administrative powers—including
permitting, licensing, and enforcement—to boards or individuals is
permitted, so long as they are merely to apply the rules.45 In the zoning
context, this typically leaves the granting of variances, special permits,
approval of subdivision plans, and many other property-specific
determinations in the hands of administrative bodies with delegated
power.46 It is before exactly these sorts of boards that the issue discussed
in this Note arises.47
II. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The Fourteenth Amendment demands that no state “shall . . . deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”48
Where the municipal government wishes to take action that would impact
“life, liberty, or property,” citizens are entitled to due process.49 Due
process takes two distinct forms: substantive (examining whether the
government had legal authority for its action), and procedural
(determining whether the government took action in a proper manner).50
This Note is concerned exclusively with procedural due process
protections.
Communications with public officials are not constitutionally
43. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A (2015); see also ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING,
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH
MUNICIPALITIES
MAY
ADOPT
ZONING
REGULATIONS
(1926),
https://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingAct1926.pdf.
44. See MCQUILLIN, supra note 31, § 26:81. Often, this authority is called the Zoning
Board of Appeals (“ZBA”) or some other similar name; this Note will often use ZBA, or “board”
more generally.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. Note, however, that delegated executive power exists in many areas of the municipal
government, not just zoning. For example, boards may properly be given authority over
administrating laws regarding licensing of amusement devices; licensing businesses for health,
safety, and sanitary compliance; permitting weapons; and issuing liquor licenses. See id. §
26:87. As will be discussed infra Part II, these determinations all raise the same constitutional
issues. This Note will retain its focus on zoning and land use authorities, but its arguments
apply with equal force in all municipal administrative contexts.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing for due
process protections against the federal government). This Note primarily handles due process
issues on the state level, so it will speak about the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the
requirements of procedural due process are identical under either amendment.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
50. For a nuanced and detailed examination of these two closely related concepts, see
generally Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural
Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 847–48 (2003).
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troublesome in a vacuum—indeed, in order to be an active and wellinformed member of the community, people should become familiar with
those in their local government.51 However, in certain contexts, those
conversations have the potential to be problematic.
Ex parte
communications, those outside of official procedure, present a significant
question in the context of determining what level of subsequent process
satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment.52 To obtain any relief on that
question, however, plaintiffs must first demonstrate that due process
protections apply.53 As this section will discuss, doing so depends on the
nature of the municipal action that is being challenged.
A. When Does Due Process Apply?
The Fourteenth Amendment contains three requirements which
trigger due process protection.54 First, there must be some state action that
will affect the citizen.55 In the context of municipal boards, this
requirement is easily satisfied: they are part of the city apparatus, and—at
minimum—any grant or denial of permits is state action.56
Second, the government action must threaten one of the protected
constitutional interests: “life, liberty, or property.”57 A municipal
proceeding is unlikely to deprive a citizen of his or her life. Practically,
property or liberty are the only interests a municipal board can touch. In
the case of zoning boards, their actions clearly impact the ways in which
people can utilize their real property. Licensing boards’ actions may
damage a person’s finances58—both money and real property are

51. See generally Margaret Stimmann Branson, The Role of Civic Education, CTR. FOR
CIVIC EDUC. (Sept. 1998), http://www.civiced.org/papers/articles role html [https://perma.cc/
62UC-QECW]. “There is no more important task than the development of an informed,
effective, and responsible citizenry.” Id.
52. See discussion infra Section III.C.
53. See WILLIAM F. FUNK, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 246
(5th ed. 2014) (stating that the threshold question, before asking how much procedure is
necessary, is whether any procedure is necessary).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Note that some may consider citizenship a
prerequisite for due process protections as well, given the text of the amendment. However,
there is great debate over when due process might apply, regardless of citizenship. See, e.g.,
Joseph Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution Reconsidered, 47 CONN. L.
REV. 879 (2015). This Note will assume that any requisite citizenship is satisfied when parties
are before municipal boards.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State . . . .”); see Wilson R. Huhn,
The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379,
1380 (2005) (“[State action is] a key component of the Fourteenth Amendment—a threshold
requirement that must be satisfied before triggering protection of our fundamental rights . . . .”).
56. See supra Section I.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
58. Ivan B.K. Levingston & Celeste M. Mendoza, Liquor Licenses Prove Critical for
Local
Restaurants,
HARV.
CRIMSON
(Apr.
25,
2014),
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traditional property interests, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.59
Municipal boards’ actions can also impact a person’s liberty.60
Zoning regulations may determine whether a business owner can realize
their vision at a particular location;61 the failure to obtain a liquor license
could derail the dreams of an aspiring restaurateur.62 The vast majority of
municipal boards’ actions will touch some citizen’s liberty or property
interest.63 However, the mere showing that a government actor is
impinging upon one’s liberty or property is not enough to trigger due
process.
Finally, the state action must affect a particular citizen (or group of
citizens) on an individualized, fact-specific basis.64 Many actions the state
takes are legislative in nature (or quasi-legislative), affecting each citizen
equally; in such cases, due process protections do not apply.65 However,
some actions impact only one person, or a discrete set of individuals based
on facts specific to them.66 These actions are judicial in nature (or quasijudicial), and trigger due process protections,67 depending on the interest
at stake.
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/4/25/liquor-licenses-square-biz/
[https://
perma.cc/4PMS-YNG2].
59. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571–72 (1972). In addition to those clear
examples of property, the concept can also extend to welfare entitlements and employment
contracts—actual or implied. Id. at 576–77.
60. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 435–36 (1971) (holding that a police
department’s branding of a woman as a habitual drunkard and resultant prohibition of sale of
alcohol to her triggered due process); Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 1347 (8th Cir.
1993) (stating that, in some circumstances, government’s infringement on good reputation can
be sufficient infringement of liberty interests).
61. See Serreze, supra note 3.
62. See Levingston & Mendoza, supra note 58.
63. Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“Without doubt, [liberty]
denotes . . . the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations
of life . . . generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”).
64. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[D]eprive any person . . . .”); see also Londoner
v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908) (ruling that where Denver sought to institute a roadimprovement tax on petitioners on the basis of their property abutting newly-paved road,
petitioners were entitled to a hearing on the specific facts to determine their tax).
65. See generally Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915)
(holding that action raising the valuation of every property in Denver equally did not entitle
each subject individual to due process claims); see also Pronghorn, Inc. v. Licensing Bd. of
Peabody, 430 N.E.2d 842, 843 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (holding that city-wide change in closing
time of bars was not an individualized determination, so did not require individual procedure).
66. See Londoner, 210 U.S. at 373–86 (discussing how each petitioner should have been
able to present evidence regarding their property’s relationship to new road before tax was
imposed).
67. Id. at 386; cf. Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 446 (contrasting Londoner: “a local board had
to determine ‘whether, in what amount, and upon whom’ . . . . A relatively small number of
persons was concerned, who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual
grounds . . . .”).
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Whether the municipal board’s action is an individualized
determination is often the critical consideration. In short, if a board’s
action is quasi-judicial,68 it satisfies the individualized determination
requirement, invoking due process.69 However, the inclusion of “quasijudicial” in that definition adds another level of complexity: which actions
are quasi-judicial, and which are quasi-legislative?
B. Distinguishing Between Quasi-Legislative and Quasi-Judicial
Actions
Municipal boards have dual functions. First, they are responsible for
promulgating rules and regulations within their jurisdiction.70 Second,
they are responsible for enforcing those rules and regulations, along with
other laws of the community with which they are charged.71 The first is
quasi-legislative (acting like a legislature) and the second is administrative
(enforcing that quasi-legislature’s laws).72 While administrative board
activity is not always adjudicatory, it will often involve making a
determination regarding a particular citizen on particular facts: in other
words, boards often act quasi-judicially when acting administratively,
such as in granting permits.73
Different jurisdictions have proposed and utilized many tests in order
to determine whether a particular board action is quasi-judicial or quasilegislative.74 The consensus that seems to emerge is that quasi-judicial
actions are those taken on the basis of facts specific to an individual,
operating from a basis of established law.75 Quasi-legislative actions,
68. Quasi-judicial, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Of, relating to, or
involving an executive or administrative official’s adjudicative acts.”); cf. Quasi-legislative,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Not purely legislative in nature . . . .”).
69. See, e.g., Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst. v. Bd. of State Exam’rs of Plumbers & Gas Fitters,
396 N.E.2d 457, 464 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
70. See, e.g., Pronghorn, Inc., 430 N.E.2d at 843 (handling a challenge to Licensing
Board’s decision to set closing-time for bars at 1:00 a m., a change from an earlier 2:00 a.m.
close).
71. See, e.g., Neuberger v. City of Portland, 603 P.2d 771, 772 (Or. 1979) (reviewing
grant of a special permit to one landowner); cf. Pronghorn, Inc., 430 N.E.2d at 845 (noting
board was not wielding its powers against a single permit-holder).
72. Pronghorn, Inc., 430 N.E.2d at 843–45; see also discussion supra Part I.
73. See Pronghorn, Inc., 430 N.E.2d at 843–45.
74. See Fasano v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’r of Washington Cty., 507 P.2d 23, 25–26, 30 (Or.
1973) (citing Illinois, Washington, and Ohio authorities in determining that test was whether
action created rule of general applicability to an open class, or application of a general rule to a
specific individual or interest); Pronghorn, Inc., 430 N.E.2d at 845 (identifying general
applicability, invocation of public need, lack of charges, and no need for hearings followed by
official findings on those charges as crucial factors weighing against quasi-judicial nature).
75. Cf. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst. v. Bd. of State Exam’rs of Plumbers & Gas Fitters, 396
N.E.2d 457, 464 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that because plumbing code amendments were
reflective of political policy choices, although they affected a closed class, they were not enacted
in response to any particular person or set of facts and therefore quasi-legislative).
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conversely, establish law with which all individuals must conform.76 As
discussed supra in Part I, the zoning context is fertile with examples of
boards acting quasi-judicially, including considering variances, special
permits, pre-existing non-conforming uses, and subdivision plans.
It is fair (although recursive) to say that those municipal board
proceedings that satisfy the individualized determination requirement of
the Fourteenth Amendment are quasi-judicial, and quasi-judicial
proceedings are those that are individualized determinations.77 In the final
analysis, the requirement of individualized determinations and the notion
of quasi-judicial proceedings are two ways of describing the same
fundamental notion: due process is only triggered where a particular
person’s constitutional rights are under threat of infringement, on the basis
of circumstances unique to that person.78
C. How Much Process is Due?
Procedural due process requires, at minimum, notice of all facts in
consideration by the quasi-judicial tribunal, opportunity to present and
rebut evidence, and a neutral decision-maker.79 As far as what measures
are actually constitutionally mandated, however, a more fact-specific
analysis controls. When a litigant claims he or she was deprived of a
procedural measure required under due process, that claim is tested
against Mathews v. Eldridge.80 In Mathews, the Supreme Court
established a three-factor balancing test for whether a measure is required
by the due process clause.81 If, in light of the competing interests of the
state (both the public’s interest and efficiency/fiscal concerns) and the
individual, the additional procedure would substantially reduce the risk of
erroneous deprivation, the proposed measure is required.82
Ex parte communications bear on all three essential fairness

76. Cast Iron, 396 N.E.2d at 464.
77. See Londoner v. City and Cty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908); Bi-Metallic Inv.
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915).
78. Cf. Londoner, 210 U.S. at 386 (discussing individualized determination requirement)
with Fasano, 507 P.2d at 25, 30 (discussing the character of quasi-judicial action by municipal
bodies).
79. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255 (1970) (discussing due process in context
of welfare termination proceedings); see also, e.g., Chrismon v. Guilford Cty., 370 S.E.2d 579,
593 (N.C. 1988) (emphasizing a zoning board’s more general “duty to exercise independent
judgment in making zoning decisions . . . .”).
80. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
81. Id. at 335. The three factors are the individual’s interest at stake, the government’s
interest at stake, and the risk of erroneous deprivation in the proposed measure’s absence. Id.
82. Id. In Mathews, the Court found a very strong state interest (effective administration
of the disability benefits program), a non-critical personal interest (disability is not a need-based
benefit), and a relatively low risk of erroneous deprivation, because the plaintiff only sought a
pre-deprivation hearing, rather than a post-deprivation hearing. Id.
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elements.83 When a party contacts a board member, any relevant
information discussed in that conversation is essentially an unnoticed, unrebuttable fact-finding session, with the board member—willingly or
not—taking evidence off the record.84 Additionally, those contacts could
introduce bias into the proceedings, whether nefarious misconduct or
subtler forms of prejudice.85
The mere fact that ex parte communications have occurred, however,
does not violate procedural due process. Municipalities would resolve the
potential constitutional issues by developing a method for handling those
contacts that satisfies the Mathews test. There are no blanket rules of what
procedure applies in a given situation.86 Rather, the Mathews test is
intended to provide a flexible method to determine what procedure is
necessary on a factual, case-by-case basis.87 After demonstrating that due
process applies, it is the task of the party claiming its protections to
demonstrate what specific provisions it requires.88
III. THE DANGER OF EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS WITHOUT
APPLICABLE LAW
In most United States jurisdictions, ex parte communications occupy
a gray area in the context of quasi-judicial municipal proceedings and their
accompanying due process rights.89 Even if ex parte communications are
recognized as potential violations of procedural due process in those
settings, there is rarely a workable legal standard set forth.90 Because ex
parte communications carry not only traditional due process dangers such
as corruption and explicit bias,91 but also threaten adjudicators’ neutrality
in more subtle ways,92 courts or legislatures must adopt a clear, uniform
standard.

83. See id.
84. See Eacret v. Bonner Cty., 86 P.3d 494, 501 (Idaho 2004).
85. See infra Part III.
86. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
87. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (citing Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961)).
88. Part VI of this Note applies the Mathews test to a proposed solution, which would
remedy due process concerns.
89. Only Oregon, Idaho, Florida, and Washington have developed clear, controlling law
on the issue. See infra Part IV.
90. See, e.g., Cernak v. Planning Bd. for the City of Easthampton, No. 10-035 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2013) (on file with author) (deciding on whether allegations of bias from ex
parte communications sufficient to void a ZBA decision).
91. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255 (1970) (guaranteeing a neutral decision
maker).
92. See infra Section III.A.
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Ex Parte Communications Present Substantial Danger of Bias

Certain types of bias, assuming they can be proven, are
unquestionable—pecuniary interest, personal interest, prejudgment, and
prejudice all violate due process.93 While ex parte communications likely
arise in the context of those biases, proof beyond improper
communications is needed to establish that level of apparent bias. More
difficult (and frustrating) cases arise where the ex parte communications
are alleged to have subtly influenced the board’s decision, without any
outright corruption.94
Social sciences have demonstrated that bias can take many forms. Of
particular note are cognitive biases, which are generally unnoticed
assumptions that play large roles in the decision-making process.95 These
biases often take the form of heuristics—essentially, shortcuts the human
brain takes in the decision-making process, without its user ever
knowing.96
Some of these cognitive biases seem particularly relevant in the
context of otherwise innocent ex parte communications. First, there is the
availability heuristic, also referred to as the “ease of retrieval” bias.97
Under this cognitive bias, decision-makers give the most credence to the
set of facts they are most easily able to recall.98 Studies demonstrate the
ease of recall is itself credited as information supporting the truth of the
matter.99
Ex parte communications thereby provide the communicator with an
invaluable persuasive edge: mere repetition of his or her points, making
them easier for the board member to recall, gives them credence and may
influence the ultimate decision.100 The availability heuristic problem is
further compounded by the concept of availability cascades: the more
common and repeated a view is, the more available it is, and, therefore,
93. See, e.g., Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 255; Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722,
725 (Or. 1980) (discussing explicit biases which would justify invalidation of municipal board’s
decision).
94. See, e.g., Cernak v. Planning Bd. for the City of Easthampton, No. 10-035 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Hampshire Cty., Mar. 26, 2013) (on file with author).
95. See Jim Taylor, Cognitive Biases are Bad for Business, PSYCHOL. TODAY (May 20,
2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-power-prime/201305/cognitive-biases-arebad-business [https://perma.cc/CT35-5TBV].
96. Id.
97. See generally Norbert Schwarz et. al., Ease of Retrieval as Information: Another
Look at the Availability Heuristic, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 195 (1991) (discussing
availability bias).
98. Id. at 195.
99. Id. at 200–01. In other words, people will generally afford more credibility to things
which are easier to recall.
100. The effect is even greater if the communication is made in an unexpected context,
e.g., by accosting the member in public—the communication is then more memorable. See id.
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the more credence it is given.101 On matters of great public concern, where
one viewpoint may be communicated much more than another, the
decision-makers may be further biased.
Perhaps even stronger is the mere exposure effect, alternatively
referred to as the familiarity principle.102 The familiarity principle
describes a phenomenon often unnoticed in daily life, but wellestablished: the more exposure one has to something, the more one likes
that thing.103 This principle applies with inanimate objects104 and human
beings105 alike. Ex parte communications provide parties with the
opportunity to show municipal decision-makers their individual
personality. The more familiar the decision-makers grow with the person,
the more they unconsciously begin to like them and want to decide a case
in their favor.106
Two other related biases are worth mentioning: the framing107 and
focusing108 effects. An ex parte contact, in addition to the benefits of
repetition, availability, and personal familiarity, provides its sender with
an opportunity to frame the issue at hand without rebuttal. Additionally,
the familiarity and repetition of the issue may attract undue focus to this
frame. A combination of focus and framing biases may be impossible to
cure once the decision-maker has encountered it.
Unless the
communications are disclosed, there is no chance for the party opponent
to challenge those biases by telling his or her own version of the same
facts, or emphasizing different facts that may be just as significant.109
B. Because of Obvious Biases, Subtle Biases, and the Extraneous FactFinding Presented by Ex Parte Communications, Jurisdictions Must

101. Timur Kuran & Kass R. Junstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 683–84 (1999).
102. See generally R.B. Zajonc, Mere Exposure: A Gateway to Subliminal, 10 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 224 (2001) (discussing familiarity bias).
103. Id. at 224.
104. Id. at 224–25. For example, mere exposure to Chinese characters—without any
meaning attached—lead to subjects developing fondness for said characters. Id.
105. See generally W.C. Swap, Interpersonal Attraction and Repeated Exposure to
Rewarders and Punishers, 3 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 248 (1977) (arguing mere
familiarity with positive humans increased fondness for them; mere exposure to negative
persons, distaste).
106. See Zajonc, supra note 102, at 224.
107. See generally James N. Druckman, Evaluating Framing Effects, 22 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 91, 91 (indicating that the frame in which a question is presented—e.g., mortality
rate versus survival rate—radically effects subsequent opinions and decisions on the matter).
108. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Would You Be Happier if You Were Richer? A
Focusing Illusion, SCIENCE 1908–10 (June 30, 2006) (discussing tendency to focus on one issue
as critical when it may not be).
109. See id.; Druckman, supra note 107, at 91. If multiple parties frame the issue and
promote different points of emphasis, these cognitive biases may be neutralized.
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Adopt Rules to Address Them
Ex parte communications in proceedings before municipal boards
acting quasi-judicially will continue to present an unknown risk in
jurisdictions that have not addressed the issue. One of the groups most
impacted by the current, cloudy situation are attorneys who represent
clients in land use or permitting proceedings.110 Attorneys are governed
by ethical rules, which have stringent guidelines on improper
communications with both adjudicators and other attorneys’ clients.111
When dealing with municipal board members—who may be both a
decision-maker and represented party—what are the boundaries of the
encounter? Do ex parte communications violate ethical rules?112 Under
the current state of the law, only the classic magic eight-ball answer
suffices: answer unclear, try again later.
All those who must have a matter decided before a municipal quasijudicial board also require a clear standard delineating their rights and the
applicable law.113 “The American commitment to the rule of law means
that every citizen is governed by the same laws, applied through a fair and
equal judicial process.”114 Each person must be quasi-judged under
equally fair due process conditions and must be entitled to equal review
of those municipal decisions.
Just as litigants would benefit from well-defined standards, judges
would too: laws should be “clearly communicated and fairly enforced.
Everyone is held accountable to the same laws.”115 Some uniform
understanding of the due process implications of ex parte communications
in quasi-judicial settings would significantly aid judges as they decide
future cases.
Last, but certainly not least, local municipalities and board members
would be greatly aided by clearer standards, defining their obligations and
providing greater predictability of outcomes.116 Currently, quasi-judicial
decision-makers in many jurisdictions have no idea of their duties or
110. See R. Lisle Baker, Ethical Limits on Attorney Contact with Represented and
Unrepresented Officials: The Example of Municipal Zoning Boards Making Site-Specific Land
Use Decisions, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 349, 349 (1997).
111. Id. at 381.
112. Id. at 382–83.
113. See Ronald D. Keefe, Guarding the Rule of Law, 87 MICH. B.J. 12, 12 (2008); see
also JUD. LEARNING CENTER, Law and the Rule of Law, http://judiciallearningcenter.org/lawand-the-rule-of-law/ [https://perma.cc/8QKB-SSHS].
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See generally Letter from Robert A. Butterworth, Florida Atty. Gen., to Hon.
Truman G. Scarborough, Jr., Chairman, Brevard Cty. Comm’n. (Aug. 19, 1994),
http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago nsf/Opinions/8D781F3363CBEE6D852562210050A78D.
This advisory opinion, sent in the wake of Jennings, was sent in response to a municipal board
seeking definitive legal guidance on an unclear area. Id.

116

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:101

obligations relative to procedural due process and ex parte
communications. Even where cities are aware of the potential problem,
there is no easy or apparent solution available.117
Were there a model rule available and adopted, these problems would
be alleviated. Land use practitioners would know more precisely how
they were allowed to communicate with board members, and exactly what
effects those communications might have. Judges would work within a
standard when ruling on issues of ex parte communications, instead of
creating unguided precedent. Board members and those before the board
would know the law and their rights.
IV. SOLUTIONS FROM THE STATES
What rule might suffice to resolve the serious issues of bias and extra
fact-finding, while remaining simple and flexible enough that any
jurisdiction could adopt it?
Other states—the laboratories of
democracy118—have already encountered the issue, and can be looked to
for guidance. While Massachusetts has only addressed the issue of ex
parte communications in quasi-judicial proceedings before municipal
boards in an obscure fashion at the lowest judicial level,119 several other
jurisdictions have settled the issue more decisively and conclusively.
Oregon, Idaho, Florida, and Washington have each attempted to resolve
the due process problems presented by ex parte communications in
municipal proceedings, each reaching divergent solutions.120
As the discussion below will indicate, each approach adopted by the
relevant state courts has its respective flaws. However, some consistent
patterns emerge after viewing the treatments in conjunction. These state
rules—both by their distinctions, and their shared features—provide
strong models (and cautionary tales) on how any state court encountering
ex parte communications in municipal proceedings should rule.

117. See, e.g., Memorandum from Berkeley City Manager to the Mayor and Members
of the City Council re: Regulation of Ex Parte Contacts, Apr. 20, 2004 (on file with author)
(attempting to proactively set plan on how to handle the issue; finding no guidance).
118. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
119. See infra Section IV.A.
120. See discussion infra. In addition to Oregon, Idaho, Florida, and Washington, several
other jurisdictions have handled the issue in a manner similar to Massachusetts—nonconclusive discussion of the issue, with murky (if any) standards emerging. See, e.g., Armstrong
v. Turner Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 772 N.W.2d 643, 653–54 (S.D. 2009) (commenting on the
problem presented by ex parte communications); City of Hobart Common Council v.
Behavioral Inst. of Ind., LLC, 785 N.E.2d 238, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing potential
problems related to off-the-record phone calls and conversations). However, because such
decisions are of very limited use in determining standards that jurisdictions could use going
forward, they are beyond the scope of this Note.
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A. Massachusetts’s Ambiguous Standard
Massachusetts provides an illustrative example of a jurisdiction that
has failed to develop a consistent standard for treating the issue, despite
consistently encountering it. As early as 1932, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts (“SJC”) encountered allegations of ex parte
communications tainting a zoning board adjudication.121 There, the SJC
held that because the plaintiffs introduced no evidence regarding the
nature of the communications or the weight afforded to them by the board
in making its decision, there was no valid claim for relief.122
In Alford v. Boston Zoning Commission, a Massachusetts appellate
court ruled that because plaintiffs’ alleged harm came as a result of quasilegislative rather than quasi-judicial actions by the zoning commission,
arguments regarding ex parte communications had no merit.123 Despite
finding that the plaintiffs had no cognizable cause of action regarding
those communications, the court’s decision seemed to imply they could
be problematic in an adjudicatory setting.124
Massachusetts’s most definitive treatment of this issue to date is
limited to a single unpublished lower court decision, although that
decision represents the only (quasi-) resolution provided to date.125
Cernak v. Planning Board for the City of Easthampton—a case
surrounding the facts discussed in the Introduction of this Note—forced a
Massachusetts district court to address the issue directly, as it was the basis
for the entire suit.126
In Cernak, the district judge found that although there were many
uncontroverted ex parte communications from the permit-seeking grocery
chain, Stop & Shop, the plaintiffs had failed to show any bias resulting
from those communications.127 First, the judge opined that the plaintiffs
had been given a full opportunity to be heard at a public hearing, and that
the board members had based their decisions solely on information
presented at public hearings.128 Next, he wrote that evidence of ex parte
communications from the first permitting process did have some probative
121. See Fandel v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment of Bost., 182 N.E. 343, 344 (Mass. 1932)
(“The precise point is whether the reading of these communications received subsequently to
the public hearing requires the quashing of the proceedings.”).
122. See id.
123. Alford v. Boston Zoning Commission, 996 N.E.2d 883, 890–891 (Mass. App. Ct.
2013).
124. Id. at 891.
125. See generally Cernak v. Planning Bd. for the City of Easthampton, No. 10-035
(Mass. Super. Ct. Hampshire Cty., Mar. 26, 2013) (on file with author).
126. See generally id. (deciding on allegations of bias from ex parte communications
sufficient to void a ZBA decision).
127. See id. at *6–7.
128. See id.
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value as to Stop & Shop’s behavior and intent, but solely provided
context.129
Ultimately, the judge drew a bright line between ex parte
communications implicating substance—which he did not observe here—
and those implicating procedure, which he viewed as harmless.130 In light
of the lack of any proven bias, lack of proof of substantive discussions,
and failure to show any consideration of ex parte communications in the
ZBA’s decision-making, the judge refused to touch the ZBA’s decision—
even where it appeared clear that Stop & Shop had intended to influence
the board.
In short, the question is not whether Stop & Shop intended to influence
the Board, but whether or not, through ex parte contacts with Board
members, Stop & Shop caused the board to do what it would not
otherwise have done. In my judgment it did not. While I do not
condone Stop & Shop’s ex parte contacts, they were not so egregious
as to affect the administrative process in a way that substantial justice
was not done.131

That quotation (frustratingly vague as it may be) represented the
entire articulation of any standard by the court. As will become clear in
discussion infra, that standard does not cleanly fit within any of the rules
utilized by other jurisdictions,132 nor with the approach used in the
administrative context.133 Additionally, it is not sufficiently definite to
provide any guidance to parties hoping to bring similar claims, and, as a
district court decision, carries no binding precedential weight.
Despite all of these deficiencies, Massachusetts law is relatively
well-developed on this issue; although its standard may not be
satisfactory, it at least implies that a showing of actual bias is required.134
However, the notion of actual bias is already contemplated by procedural
due process, under the prong of an impartial tribunal.135 Ex parte
communications present a unique danger of subtler bias that, operating in
conjunction with their nature as off-the-record fact-finding sessions,136
renders ex parte communications severely problematic.

129. Id. at *7.
130. See id. at *6–7 (“[C]ontacts . . . did not include substantive discussions of the denial
of the First Application or the merits of the Second . . . .”).
131. Id. at *8.
132. See infra Part IV.
133. See infra Part V.
134. See Cernak v. Planning Bd. for the City of Easthampton, No. 10-035, at *8 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Hampshire Cty., Mar. 26, 2013) (on file with author).
135. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255 (1970) (discussing impartial tribunal
requirement in terms of pecuniary interest and prejudgment bias).
136. See Eacret v. Bonner Cty., 86 P.3d 494, 501 (Idaho 2004).
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B. Oregon’s Presumption of No Bias
Oregon was an early trailblazer in establishing the due process rights
of parties subject to individualized determinations by municipal boards.
In 1973, the Oregon Supreme Court (sitting en banc) heard the case of
Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners of Washington County.137 A
property owner had applied for and been granted a rezoning permit, which
would allow him to convert his parcel—previously only approved for a
single-home residence—into a trailer park.138 Abutters to the rezoned
parcel, hoping to avoid a trailer park in their neighborhood, brought an
action in the district court to challenge the board’s permit.139
Previously, Oregon had operated by the long-standing blanket rule
that all zoning actions were legislative acts, and therefore assigned
presumptions of validity. The Oregon Supreme Court, however, held
zoning actions that affected the concrete rights of individuals on an
individualized basis were quasi-judicial, despite the old rule.140 Although
the Fasano decision was about the scope of review that could be applied
to certain board actions,141 its authorization of the characterization of those
actions as quasi-judicial brought with it all the accompanying nuances of
quasi-judicial categorization, including due process rights.142
1. Movement from Broad Promises to a Narrow Rule
Seven years later, in 1980, the Oregon Supreme Court was called to
determine which due process rights ought to be afforded to interested
parties in quasi-judicial municipal decisions.143 The court in Fasano had
announced that “parties at the hearing before the . . . governing body are
entitled to . . . a tribunal which is impartial in the matter—i.e., having had
no pre-hearing or ex parte [sic] contacts concerning the question at

137. See generally Fasano v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’r of Washington Cty., 507 P.2d 23 (Or.
1973) (holding that rezoning of property based on facts unique to said property was quasijudicial activity by the board).
138. Id. at 25.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 26 (“At this juncture we feel we would be ignoring reality to rigidly view
all zoning decisions by local governing bodies as legislative acts to be accorded a full
presumption of validity and shielded from less than constitutional scrutiny by the theory of
separation of powers.”).
141. See id. at 25, 30. Because deeming the board’s actions quasi-judicial removed the
legislative presumption of validity, the test became whether there was a “justifiable basis” in
the record for the board’s decision. Because there was no ascertainable record to speak of, the
decision in Fasano could not be so justified, and the lower courts’ decisions to invalidate the
change of use were affirmed. Id.
142. See supra Part II.
143. See generally Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722 (Or. 1980) (deciding
whether, in context of quasi-judicial proceedings, off-the-record dealings and conversations
between parties and board violated due process).
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issue.”144 Based on that language, Oregonians who wished to challenge
municipal boards’ quasi-judicial actions believed a showing of ex parte
communications would serve as a de facto violation of parties’ due
process rights, thereby invalidating the board’s action.145
Neuberger v. City of Portland brought the language from Fasano and
the resulting arguments into sharp focus. In Neuberger, Portland’s city
council had granted a special zone change to a developer, which would
entitle him to a greatly increased building density on his land.146
Throughout the permitting process, the developer had been negotiating the
sale of another, abutting property to the city—Portland hoped to add the
land to its city park.147 Additionally, the permit-seeking developer’s
attorney contributed language to the drafting of the ordinance enacting the
city council’s decision; the city did not provide the opponents with the
same opportunity.148
The opponents of the rezone were disturbed by these ongoing
communications, arguing they must have influenced the board’s
decision.149 Relying on the language from Fasano indicating ex parte
communications were incongruous with the notion of an impartial
tribunal,150 the opponents urged the Oregon Supreme Court to invalidate
the city council’s actions.
The Neuberger court declined the challenger’s invitation: “Fasano
should not be read as adopting a mechanical rule that any ex parte [sic]
contact touching on a matter before a tribunal acting quasi-judicially
renders the tribunal, or its affected members, unable to act in that
matter.”151 Rather, the court indicated, reviewing courts should focus on
whether there was any real, apparent bias in the decision.152 “The issue is
not whether there were any ex parte [sic] contacts, but whether the
evidence shows that the tribunal or its members were biased. In this case
it does not.”153
2. A Rule That Offers No Relief?
By overturning (or, at the least, severely restricting) the portion of
144. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 30.
145. See Neuberger, 607 P.2d at 725 (noting opponents’ arguments that ex parte
communications are condemned by Fasano and a default violation of due process).
146. See Neuberger v. City of Portland, 603 P.2d 771, 771 (Or. 1979) (granting petition
for review and developing the facts of the case).
147. Id. at 725.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See Fasano v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’r of Wash. Cty., 507 P.2d 23, 30 (Or. 1973).
151. Neuberger, 607 P.2d at 725.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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the Fasano decision pertaining to ex parte communications, Oregon
essentially instituted a rule presuming that off-the-record communications
were non-prejudicial.154 In practice, this rule has proved fatal to any
challenges of zoning actions founded on concerns over ex parte
communications or resulting bias.155
Even in cases where circumstantial evidence of improper influence
resulting from ex parte communications is substantial and compelling,
Oregon’s Supreme Court has refrained from invalidating municipal board
decisions without hard evidence.156 In 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco
County Court, the court reversed the appeals court’s finding of bias where
a board member ordering a municipal incorporation election had been in
persistent, off-the-record contact with the aspirant town.157
The group hoping to incorporate in 1000 Friends resided at a former
ranch in Oregon’s cattle-country desert.158 One member of the county
commission that ordered the election was a cattle rancher.159 Before
ordering the vote, the rancher-commissioner had sold cattle to the ranch
residents at a price well above fair market value.160 The record was replete
with evidence that the ranchers had been eager buyers; that conversations
regarding the sale were ongoing off the record throughout the
incorporation process; that the sale had never been made public; and that
the buyers had endeavored to keep the transaction “low key,” so as not to
“embarrass” the purchasing county commissioner.161
154. See id. at 725–26 (Or. 1980). The plaintiffs’ showing of ex parte communications—
indeed, strong contextual evidence that there may have been a trade-off of the permit for a
favorable sale price on the concurrent transaction, not completed until after the rezone—got
them nowhere. Id. Because they could not demonstrate any prejudice, in light of the fact that
discussions of the sale were on the record, inferences of bias were not sufficient. Id.
155. See Columbia Riverkeeper v. Clatsop Cty., 341 P.3d 790, 804 (Or. Ct. App. 2014)
(noting no reported Oregon case had ever required the non-participation of a municipal board
member in land use proceedings).
156. See generally 1000 Friends of Or. v. Wasco Cty. Ct., 742 P.2d 39 (Or. 1987)
(representing the Oregon Supreme Court’s most recent statement on ex parte communications
and bias in the relevant context).
157. Id. at 40–41.
158. See id. at 40; see also Oregon Experience: Rajneeshpuram (Or. Public Broadcasting
television
broadcast
Nov.
19,
2012),
http://www.opb.org/television/
programs/oregonexperience/segment/rajneeshpuram/ [https://perma.cc/9Q4F-NX9B].
The
former ranch was occupied by followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, an Indian spiritual leader.
Rajneesh and thousands of his followers, called “sannyasins,” moved to Wasco County in 1981
and sought to build a utopian community, called Rajneeshpuram. Id. However, the commune’s
gathering of many societal misfits—including transients, traumatized veterans, and children of
the psychedelic era—chafed on the commune’s rural neighbors. Id. Tensions rose consistently,
especially when the commune developed an armed defense force. Id. After attempts to become
a recognized Oregon city were met with extensive legal battles, Rajneeshpuram existence ended
in 1986. Id.
159. See 1000 Friends, 742 P.2d at 40.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 40–41.
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Despite this circumstantial evidence—seemingly enough to allow an
inference of a favorable deal on property exchanged for a favorable vote—
the court held that the challengers had not made a sufficient showing of
bias to invalidate the commission’s decision.162 In so deciding, the court
wrote that invalidating local boards’ decisions merely because they appear
unfair would lead to invalidating otherwise “correct and fair” decisions.163
The court left the question open as to what would suffice to show that
a decision was not correct and fair. To be sure, there are situations where
the mere existence of off-the-record communications does not implicate
unfairness in the decision.164 Oregon’s legislature provided a specific
avenue to ensure ex parte communications have no harmful effect: so long
as any communications are disclosed on the record, including both the
senders’ identities and the messages’ content, and parties are informed of
their right to rebut that content, there is no due process violation.165
If, however, those communications are left undisclosed at the
municipal level, aggrieved parties are left with the doctrine expressed in
both Neuberger and 1000 Friends. Oregon’s statute, while a good first
step in resolving the issue, provides no meaningful protection against ex
parte communications that remain undisclosed—a gap that has not been
filled by the judiciary.
The courts have provided some suggestion as to what may be
sufficient to prove bias in Oregon.166 If a party can demonstrate ex parte
communications were made in conjunction with covert dealings, express
or implied agreements, or as part of bribery, extortion, or the like, they
clearly violate due process; however, the party needs absolute proof of
those events, not the mere suggestion they exist.167 Because business
deals may be made for many reasons, and board members are generally
laypeople who have occupations beyond their municipal duties, plaintiffs
must be able to demonstrate that improper influence was the motivating
factor, above all other potential motivations for a deal.168
162. Id. at 46.
163. Id. at 44.
164. See Tierney v. Duris, 536 P.2d 435, 443 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (holding pre-Neuberger
that there was no due process concern where ex parte communications were innocent and were
disclosed on the record).
165. OR. REV. STAT. § 215.422(3) (2015).
166. See 1000 Friends, 742 P.2d at 41 (noting that challengers had no proof of express
contingency of vote for incorporation election on above-market purchase of cattle; could not
show a deal so one-sided as to obviously be a payoff or sham transaction; and were unable to
prove any conversations occurred in the context of the business deal about the vote).
167. Neuberger v. Portland, 607 P.2d 722, 725 (Or. 1980) (listing how bias could be
proved).
168. See 1000 Friends, 742 P.2d at 42–43; cf. Eastgate Theater v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’r,
588 P.2d 640, 644 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (stating while a judge is expected to be detached,
municipal board members were expected to be intensely involved in community).

2017]

MUNICIPAL PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

123

In cases where undisclosed ex parte communications, viewed in
context, seem to evince probable bias, there is a significant issue of proof
for prospective challengers: how can they find the elusive, proverbial
“smoking gun?”169 By the inherent nature of secret deals, they typically
remain secret—any hard evidence of their existence rests solely with those
who made them. Requiring challengers to provide definitive proof of a
scheme presents a near-insurmountable obstacle.170
Additionally, the explicit mention of only clear quid pro quo bargains
accompanying ex parte communications as proof of bias171 is problematic
for potential challengers, beyond issues of proof. Subtler forms of bias
can result from ex parte communications, which are not as obvious or
malicious as the crass corruption imagined by the Oregon Supreme Court
in Neuberger.172
Oregonians who feel that ex parte communications irreparably
influenced a municipal board’s quasi-judicial decision, yet do not allege
an explicit scheme or exchange, may be left in the cold, given the
indications that only apparent bias of a gross nature will ever vitiate such
decisions.173 Unless ex parte bias left a board member with actual bias on
the narrow issue in determination, such that he or she would be incapable
of determining the case on the merits, it has not violated due process under
Oregon law.174
C. Idaho’s Automatic—Albeit Limited—Invalidation
Fasano’s impact was not limited to the Pacific Northwest. Among
others, Idaho viewed the Oregon Supreme Court’s holding as the correct
view of the law, with its own Supreme Court holding in Cooper v. Board
of County Commissioners of Ada County that, depending on the nature of
a municipal board’s action, it could be either quasi-legislative or quasi-

169. See Robert C. Cadle, Burdens of Proof: Presumption and Pretext in Disparate
Treatment Employment Discrimination Cases, 78 MASS. L. REV. 122, 122–23 (1993)
(discussing how presumptions are used in employment discrimination law, given sophisticated
corruption and the resulting lack of “smoking guns”).
170. See Hebert v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 872 F.2d 1104, 1115 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating
that circumstantial evidence is typically the only kind available in discrimination cases);
Wheelock Coll. v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 355 N.E.2d 309, 314 (Mass. 1976)
(“We recognize, however, that proof of unlawful discrimination rarely can be established by
direct evidence”).
171. See Neuberger, 607 P.2d at 725.
172. See supra Part III, Section IV.B.
173. See, e.g., Columbia Riverkeeper v. Clatsop Cty., 341 P.3d 790, 800–01 (Or. App.
2014) (holding one of three county commissioners may have prejudged issue, but did not infect
tribunal’s decision).
174. Id. at 804.
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judicial.175 As in Oregon, a case questioning the effect of ex parte
communications under the due process protections in quasi-judicial
municipal proceedings ultimately followed.176
1. An Equal and Opposite Reaction to Neuberger
Idaho Historic Preservation Council, Inc. v. City Council of Boise
presented a case centered on the demolition of a historic warehouse.177
The Boise City Council had given the building’s owners a certificate of
appropriateness for demolition in a proceeding found to be quasi-judicial
under Cooper.178 Accordingly, due process required that all interested
parties be provided with an opportunity to comment on the record and
rebut contrary evidence, and that the city council’s decision be confined
to that record.179
However, in the process of making its final determination regarding
the demolition of the warehouse, the Boise City Council had received
multiple phone calls regarding the merits of the application for a
demolition certificate.180 Not only had the councilmembers received these
calls, they had failed to disclose the callers’ identities or affiliations, or
indicate the content of those calls—they merely stated in public meetings
that they had taken calls.181
The Idaho Supreme Court held the Council’s failure to provide
sufficient information about the calls was a violation of the process due to
interested parties.182 Because the City Council essentially held a “second
fact-gathering session without . . . notice” or opportunity to rebut
evidence, its subsequent action could not stand.183
In making its decision, Idaho’s Supreme Court acknowledged
Oregon’s harsher rule; still, “[e]ven if this Court were persuaded that
Tierney and Neuberger express the better rule,” the communications at
issue here were never disclosed on the record.184 In fact, although the

175. Cooper v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’r of Ada Cty., 614 P.2d 947 (Idaho 1980) (citing
Fasano v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’r of Wash. Cty., 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973)).
176. See generally Idaho Hist. Pres. Council, Inc. v. City Council of Boise, 8 P.3d 646
(Idaho 2000) (addressing issue of ex parte communications in quasi-judicial processes before
municipal boards).
177. Id. at 647–48.
178. See id. at 649 (citing Cooper, 614 P.2d at 947).
179. See Chambers v. Kootenai Cty., 867 P.2d 989, 992 (Idaho 1994) (citing U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV).
180. Idaho Hist., 8 P.3d at 648.
181. Id. at 650–51.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 649.
184. Id. at 650; cf. Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722, 725 (Or. 1980)
(highlighting fact that ongoing, separate sale negotiations had been discussed on the record);

2017]

MUNICIPAL PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

125

language of the Historic Preservation Council decision seems to imply
that ex parte communications are de facto violations of due process
protections, the true holding is limited to cases where those
communications’ existence and content are not disclosed.185
2. Potent in Theory, Limited by Facts
At the time of the Historic Preservation Council decision, observers
assumed that the holding would give Idaho residents challenging
municipal quasi-judicial decisions more leverage upon showing that
undisclosed ex parte communications had occurred than their Oregonian
counterparts.186 Critics feared that holding city councilors to a standard
requiring them to disclose all contact with constituents regarding a matter
of public concern or face reversal would have a chilling effect on the roles
of public servants, which was echoed in the dissent.187
However, Idaho’s treatment of ex parte communications in quasijudicial, municipal proceedings since the Historic Preservation Council
decision has demonstrated those fears to be unfounded. Certainly, in cases
where ex parte communications have functioned as the undisclosed
second fact-gathering sessions that were of concern in Historic
Preservation Council, Idaho’s Supreme Court has not hesitated to
invalidate decisions on those grounds.188 However, there are very few
instances where all the requisite conditions for overturning decisions on
this basis have been met.189
For example, where a county board member had made statements
indicating prejudgment regarding a proposed boathouse variance; had
communicated with the permit-seeking parties off the record; and had
conducted a site-visit without notifying the parties, the Idaho Supreme
Court found due process violations.190 Again, the concept of un-rebuttable
fact-finding was at the heart of the court’s decision: “Mueller effectively
Tierney v. Duris, 536 P.2d 435, 443 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (ruling that because ex parte
communications were disclosed, no due process violation).
185. Idaho Hist., 8 P.3d at 651 (“We also hold that the City Council violated due process
by accepting ex parte [sic] telephone calls without disclosing the names of the callers and the
substance of the callers’ comments concerning the proposed destruction of the Foster
Building.”).
186. See Michael Asimow, News from the States: Idaho Supreme Court Rules on Ex
Parte Communications to City Council, 26 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 16, 16–17 (2001).
187. Id. (citing Idaho Hist., 8 P.3d at 651–52 (Kidwell, J., dissenting)).
188. See Eacret v. Bonner Cty., 86 P.3d 494, 501 (Idaho 2004) (holding that challengers’
due process rights were violated by undisclosed ex parte communications), overruled on
different grounds by City of Osburn v. Randel, 277 P.3d 353 (Idaho 2012) (pertaining only to
holding on attorneys’ fees, irrelevant here).
189. See Eacret, 86 P.3d at 501. After review of Idaho appellate law, the author could
identify this as the only time the absolute ban has been effectuated.
190. See id. at 496–97, 499–501.
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had evidence derived from the ex parte contacts and the unauthorized
view that was not available to the entire Board or equally to the parties.”191
The rule Idaho practitioners have derived from Historic Preservation
Council and the limited cases following its principles is that ex parte
contacts that provide decision-makers with facts external to the public
record must be disclosed.192 This rule seems to exclude ex parte
communications that do not introduce new evidence into the record.
Communications unrelated to the substance of a quasi-judicial
proceeding, which may appear to be harmless, can nonetheless imbue a
decision maker with bias.193 This apparent exclusion of non-factual
communications leaves a significant gap in Idaho’s protection of
aggrieved parties. Idaho’s challengers can only succeed upon a showing
that undisclosed ex parte communications touched the merits of the
adjudication at issue—if they fail to make that showing, they are left to
prove apparent bias.194 For reasons discussed in IV.B supra, actual bias
is incredibly difficult to prove. While Idahoans may have a slightly more
forgiving standard than their Oregonian counterparts, it is little comfort to
those who find themselves injured by the more subtle, pernicious forms
of bias.195
D. A Presumption of Bias: Florida’s Approach
As demonstrated by the laws in Oregon and Idaho, nominal
protection against undisclosed ex parte communications does not
necessarily solve the more subtle issues presented by those contacts.196 In
the early 1990s, between Oregon and Idaho establishing their individual
rules, Floridian courts took a tack nearly opposite Oregon’s.197
1. The Birth of a Presumption
In Jennings v. Dade County, a Florida appellate court considered
whether undisclosed ex parte communications in a zoning variance
proceeding, where a man sought to turn his residential property into a

191. Id. at 501.
192. See Renee Magee & Joseph H. Groberg, Representing Clients in Land Use
Decisions—A View from the Inside, 49 ADVOCATE (IDAHO) 15, 15–16 (2006).
193. See supra Section III.A.
194. See Spencer v. Kootenai Cty., 180 P.3d 487, 493 (Idaho 2008) (holding that
elements of procedural due process in land use decisions are limited to an opportunity to be
heard, notice, and the chance to present and rebut all evidence; stating that impartiality is a
separate issue, and requires substantial proof).
195. See supra Part III.
196. Id.
197. See John W. Howell & David J. Russ, Planning v. Zoning: Snyder Decision
Changes Rezoning Standards, 68 FLA. B.J. 16, 21 (1994).
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quick-change oil business, were sufficient to revoke the permit.198 The
Jennings court held that those communications presented a due process
issue in the strongest terms: “[e]x parte [sic] communications are
inherently improper and are anathema to quasi-judicial proceedings.
Quasi-judicial officers should avoid all such contacts where they are
identifiable.”199 Further, the court’s language was not limited to
undisclosed contacts only—the occurrence of any ex parte contact was
sufficient to trigger the Jennings rule.200
Florida did not stop at removing the distinction between disclosed
and undisclosed ex parte communications.
Once a challenger
demonstrated the existence of those contacts, under the Jennings rule,
“[their] effect is presumed to be prejudicial unless the defendant proves
the contrary by competent evidence.”201 This standard (and its legal
foundation) was reiterated and endorsed by the Florida Supreme Court in
Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder.202
Florida’s rule prompted fervent reactions amongst the land-use
community, ranging from academic concern203 to pragmatic suggestions
on how to proceed under the recent decisions.204 Participants on all sides
of quasi-judicial municipal decisions—boards, permit-seekers,
challengers, and all of their attorneys—were advised to avoid lobbying,
record and disclose any material, off-the-record communications on the
merits, but still not fear harmless, pleasantry-type contacts.205 Although
the courts had instituted a presumption of bias resulting from ex parte
communications, that presumption was clearly rebuttable, and the nature
of communications would still play a significant role.206
2. Powerful, Yet Flexible: The Jennings Presumption and its
Boundaries
After the Jennings and Snyder decisions, important questions
remained as to how strong the presumption resulting from ex parte
communications was. Jennings provided some indication, listing
factors—taken from a seminal administrative law case, Professional Air
198. Jennings v. Dade Cty., 589 So. 2d 1337, 1339–40 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(noting that communications included benign contact and the hiring of a lobbyist), rev. denied,
598 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1992).
199. Id. at 1341.
200. See id.
201. Id.
202. 627 So. 2d 469, 472 (Fla. 1993).
203. See generally Paul R. Gougelman III, The Death of Zoning As We Know It, 67 FLA.
B.J. 25 (1993) (heralding Snyder as the dawn of a new, uncertain era of Florida zoning law).
204. See Howell & Russ, supra note 197, at 22–24.
205. Id.
206. Jennings, 589 So. 2d at 1341.
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Traffic Controllers Organization v. Federal Labor Relations
Authority207—that should be considered in evaluating whether
communications were in fact prejudicial, after the presumption arose.208
Those factors (hereinafter “Jennings” or “PATCO factors”) included (1)
the gravity of the communications; (2) the likelihood that the contacts
influenced the board’s ultimate decision; (3) whether the party who made
the contacts benefitted from the decision; (4) whether the opposing party
knew of the content of the contacts therefore having the opportunity to
rebut their facts; and (5) whether vacating the decision and remanding it
would serve a useful purpose.209
Under Florida law, the presumption that arose after showing ex parte
communications was a “presumption affecting the burden of proof.”210
Where a presumption is utilized to put into force public policy objectives,
it is a presumption bearing on proof;211 the presumption of bias upon a
showing of ex parte communications was instituted in order to promote
the strong social policy of fundamental fairness in quasi-judicial
determinations.212 Essentially, the Jennings presumption satisfies the
burden of production and persuasion.213 Absent any other proof, it both
establishes bias and is sufficient to base a ruling upon.214 Municipal
boards presumed biased should testify and introduce other evidence
regarding the adapted PATCO factors, in order to counter-persuade
against the presumption.215
3. Democracy in Action: Eradicating a Promising Judicial
Solution
Florida law immediately following Jennings and Snyder seemed to
resolve the gaps in Oregon and Idaho’s laws, without losing their
strengths—it gave prospective challengers assurance their claims were
taken seriously and recognized the more subtle forms of bias that could
result from ex parte communications.216 However, this solution was shortlived. Florida citizens, frustrated because they interpreted Jennings as

207. 685 F.2d 547, 564–65 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (hereinafter “PATCO”).
208. See Jennings, 589 So. 2d at 1341 (citing PATCO, 685 F.2d at 564–65 (D.C. Cir.
1982)). The PATCO decision will be discussed further in Part V infra.
209. See id.
210. See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.303–304 (2015) (dividing presumptions into two categories:
those bearing on the burden of producing evidence, and those bearing on the burden of proof).
211. FLA. STAT. § 90.303 (2015).
212. See Jennings, 589 So. 2d at 1344–45 (Barkdull, J., concurring).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 1341 (citing Prof’l Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Fed. Labor Relations
Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 564–65 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
216. See supra Section III.A.
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denying them access to their elected officials, petitioned the legislature for
help.217
In 1995, the Florida legislature enacted a statute that required
disclosure of ex parte communications (including their sender and
content) on the record in quasi-judicial proceedings before municipal
boards, thereby removing the judicial presumption instituted in
Jennings.218 However, this disclosure requirement and presumption
exception was limited. It only applied to boards filled by elected officials,
had no application in local land use decisions, and was only operative if
adopted by the local body.219 The statute also took special care to ensure
that Jennings did not retain any force whatsoever over zoning: in local
land use decisions, no one would be prohibited from communicating with
a board member by ex parte prohibitions.220 Such communications do not
need to be disclosed, nor do they create a presumption of bias.221
Through that statute, Florida’s unique rule governing quasi-judicial
proceedings before municipal boards was neutered as applicable to the
very context for which it was instituted—due process protections in local
land-use decisions.222 It is unclear how the Jennings rule and presumption
would have prevented citizens from communicating with their elected
officials. Because disclosure on the record and whether the ex parte
communications originated from a party are prominent factors in
weighing the prejudicial effect of a communication,223 it seems unlikely
that disclosed communications from non-invested parties would ever be
cause for vacation of a board decision. Regardless, Floridians raised their
voices in protest, and Florida’s brief-lived presumption of bias (along with
its potential relief for aggrieved citizens) was discarded.
E. Washington’s Proactive Legislation
Unlike the other states addressed to this point, Washington did not
wait for a case to present itself before addressing ex parte
communications. In the early 1980s, the legislature enacted a statute,
claiming the first and (to date) final word on the issue.224 Under section
42.36.060 of the Washington Revised Code, ex parte communications
217. Bernard R. Appleman, Can Florida’s Legislative Standard of Review for SmallScale Land Use Amendments be Justified?, 24 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 305, 337 (2006).
218. FLA. STAT. § 286.0115(1) (2015).
219. FLA. STAT. § 286.0115 (2015).
220. FLA. STAT. § 286.0115(2)(c) (2015).
221. Id.
222. See Jennings v. Dade Cty., 589 So. 2d 1337, 1344–45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(Barkdull, J., concurring).
223. See id. at 1341 (citing Prof’l Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Fed. Labor Relations
Auth., 685 F.2d 547, 564–65 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
224. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.060 (2015).
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between any member of a decision-making body and opponents or
proponents of a pending quasi-judicial measure are forbidden, unless two
conditions are met.225 First, the substance of any such contact must be
placed on the record.226 Second, the content of the messages and a party’s
right to rebut that content must be announced at any proceeding where the
measure is in determination.227
Washington’s statutory text answers the fears that the Florida statute
sought to assuage, without denying relief to parties aggrieved by
undisclosed ex parte contacts: the prohibition does not “preclude
correspondence between a citizen and his or her elected official if any such
correspondence is made a part of the record when it pertains to the subject
matter of a quasi-judicial proceeding.”228 The fundamental requirement
remains disclosure on the record.229 Washington found no need to
dispense with it, despite the elected nature of a board member.230
Other provisions of Washington’s Revised Code preclude some ex
parte contacts from the disclosure requirement.231 For example, if
contacts are made by virtue of a board member carrying on the business
of his or her office, unrelated to the matter in determination, they need not
be disclosed and do not violate quasi-judicial due process.232 This
provision makes clear that ex parte contacts will only matter if they
reference the merits or material facts of a current adjudication.
Also, no person who, in the process of running for elected office,
comments on the merits of a situation that they must later rule on as a
result of being elected to office violates due process on the basis of those
earlier comments.233 That section allays any concerns that public-minded
prospective officials will refrain from civic engagement, or that candidates
will be unavailable to citizens, as communications made in such contexts
are totally harmless under the statute.234
However, the Washington statutes requiring and exempting
disclosure leave a significant question unspoken and unanswered: what
happens when municipal quasi-judicial decision-makers do not disclose
ex parte communications when required? Unlike the brief JenningsSnyder regime in Florida, the Washington statute provides no convenient
225. Id.
226. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.060(1) (2015).
227. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.060(2) (2015).
228. Id.
229. See id.
230. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 286.0115(2)(c) (2015).
231. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 42.36.020, 42.36.040 (2015); see discussion infra.
232. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.020 (2015). This Section is applicable to any board
member and any constituent—even those with matters currently before the board. Id.
233. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.040 (2015).
234. Id.
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list of factors to determine the prejudicial effect of a communication, nor
a presumption to aid those challenging decisions.235
Rather, proceedings where ex parte communications are not
disclosed when otherwise required are reviewed under a common-law
doctrine called “the appearance of fairness.”236 Under that doctrine,
decisions reached by a municipal body in a quasi-judicial proceeding must
be fair in both fact and appearance.237 If a “reasonably prudent and
disinterested observer” would perceive a quasi-judicial proceeding to be
unfair, it is treated as such, and therefore invalid.238 Unfairness can
manifest in several ways, but generally takes the form of three classic
biases: prejudgment, hostility and favoritism, and personal interest.239
The appearance of fairness doctrine theoretically provides some
relief to parties left disappointed with the results of a quasi-judicial
municipal determination, assuming they can show ex parte
communications were made that should have been disclosed.240 Ex parte
contacts bear on issues of prejudgment, favoritism, and interest—all
critical concerns under the doctrine.241 One can imagine the litigants from
Neuberger or 1000 Friends succeeding under the doctrine: the off-therecord business dealings in those cases certainly lead to a reasonable
inference of some apparent unfairness.242
Still, the appearance of fairness doctrine is no silver bullet resolving
the issue. Because of its potentially broad application, Washington courts
have been reluctant to apply it, to the point that it may essentially be deadletter law.243 Indeed, where the courts discuss the appearance of fairness
doctrine, they consistently find it has not been violated.244
235. See supra Section IV.D.
236. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.020 (2015); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.040
(2015). These sections, in their most technical operation, announce situations where ex parte
communications are not reported, triggering the doctrine of appearance of fairness, but are
exempted from said doctrine. Id.
237. See Carolyn M. Van Noy, Comment, The Appearance of Fairness Doctrine: A
Conflict in Values, 61 WASH. L. REV. 533, 534 (1986).
238. W.T. Watterson, Comment, What Ever Happened to the Appearance of Fairness
Doctrine? Local Land Use Decisions in an Age of Statutory Progress, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
653, 654 (1998).
239. Id. at 658–59 (citing Buell v. Bremerton, 495 P.2d 1358, 1362 (Wash. 1972)).
240. See id.
241. Id. at 659.
242. See Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722, 725–26 (Or. 1980); see also 1000
Friends of Oregon v. Wasco Cty. Ct., 742 P.2d 39, 40 (Or. 1987).
243. Watterson, supra note 238, at 666. Between 1982 and the date of this Note’s
publication, Washington’s higher courts had not held a single violation of the doctrine in landuse contexts. Id.
244. See Org. to Pres. Agr. Lands v. Adams Cty., 913 P.2d 793, 804–05 (Wash. 1996)
(holding undisclosed ex parte communications were at worst duplicative of facts already on the
record and did not violate appearance of fairness doctrine); see also Bjarnson v. Kitsap Cty.,
899 P.2d 1290, 1294 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that rehearing excluding official tainted
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Just as an apparently unfair proceeding would be invalid, an
apparently fair one would be valid.245 This presents a significant problem
to potential challengers of quasi-judicial actions: more subtle forms of bias
(which could be referred to under the umbrella of favoritism) are not
apparent in the same way that interest or prejudgment may be.246 A
proceeding could appear to be fair, but in fact be tainted by impropriety.247
Even the appearance of fairness doctrine requires “sufficient evidence
demonstrating bias, such as personal or pecuniary interest on the part of
commissioner; mere speculation is not enough.”248 Ultimately, the
appearance of fairness doctrine seems to present the same obstacle of
proof of bias as a standard requiring actual, proven bias.249
Beyond its inherent weaknesses, there is a practical problem in the
appearance of fairness doctrine. Were it to be a part of a standard for other
jurisdictions, those jurisdictions would need an already-developed body
of common law relating to quasi-judicial decision-makers’ partiality.250
Washington is the only state with such a background, and the only state
that has ever fully endorsed the doctrine.251
While Washington’s combination of statutory regime with commonlaw relief could feasibly help those who seek to challenge quasi-judicial
municipal action, its practical restraints and judicial reluctance limit its
potential, both within and beyond Washington. Although Washington’s
system provides some positive attributes, a model rule for the handling of
ex parte communications needs to be clearer in order to provide a
meaningful opportunity for relief to aggrieved parties.
V. LEGISLATURE AND JUDICIARY IN HARMONY: THE FEDERAL

by ex parte communications satisfied appearance doctrine); Snohomish Cty. Improvement All.
v. Snohomish Cty., 808 P.2d 781, 786–87 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (ruling that campaign
contributions by interested parties to council members were not ex parte communications, so
failure to disclose was not unfair).
245. See Van Noy, supra note 237, at 534.
246. See, e.g., Bunko v. City of Puyallup Civil Service Comm’n, 975 P.2d 1055, 1057,
1060–61 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). In Bunko, the lower court had found that several informal
conversations indicating friendship between employment commission and police chief—
including condolences on deaths in the family, thanks for personal advice on firearm purchases,
and complaints about office staff at the police department—during the course of plaintiff’s
grievance hearing violated appearance of fairness doctrine. Id. The appeals court reversed,
saying that the conversations had nothing to do with “the matter in determination,” contrary to
statutory requirements. Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.060 (2015).
247. See supra Part III.
248. Bunko, 975 P.2d at 1060.
249. Cf. supra Section IV.C.
250. See generally Van Noy, supra note 237 (tracing the history of the doctrine from
Washington’s early judicial history to the present).
251. See Watterson, supra note 238, at 654–55.
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GOVERNMENT’S SOLUTION
The handling of ex parte communications in the municipal quasijudicial context is, by its very terms, a state-level legal issue. However,
that does not render federal law irrelevant in determining the best way to
handle the issue. Aside from municipal boards, quasi-judicial proceedings
arise in another significant context: federal administrative law.252
Administrative law controls the relationships between government
agencies, the entities they regulate, the beneficiaries of their actions, and
the federal judiciary’s review of those actions.253 The Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”)254 governs almost all aspects of administrative
law.
Pursuant to the APA, agencies exercise two primary functions in
carrying out their broader business of administrating federal laws and
policy: rulemaking and adjudication.255 When an agency issues a
statement of general (or particular) applicability that has future effect, and
future effect only, that agency participates in rulemaking. 256 By contrast,
when an agency formulates an order257 specific to one party, it participates
in adjudication.258 For example, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) may make a rule regarding emissions from automobiles; that rule
applies to all auto manufacturers equally, and its creation is rulemaking.259
If, however, the EPA sought to force one particular manufacturer to stop
violating that rule, then it would be adjudicating the matter.
An agency, therefore, has dual natures: it is both legislative and
judicial, exercising both functions in its broader role as an administrator
of the law.260 Accordingly, agency actions can be characterized as quasilegislative, or quasi-judicial.261 The direct nexus between administrative
agencies and municipal bodies is evident—both are bodies of dual nature
and purpose, and accordingly incur different obligations depending on the

252. See FUNK ET. AL., supra note 53, at 22 (noting that adjudication—a critical agency
function—corresponds with the judicial process).
253. See Administrative law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also FUNK
ET. AL., supra note 53, at 5–6.
254. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2015).
255. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2015).
256. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)–(5) (2015).
257. 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (2015) (“‘[O]rder’ means the whole or a part of a final disposition,
whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other
than rule making but including licensing . . . .”).
258. 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (2015).
259. See generally Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (regarding attempts to
institute EPA emissions rulemaking).
260. See FUNK ET. AL., supra note 53, at 21–22.
261. Id. (noting that some actions are like those of congresses, while some are like those
of courts).
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actions they engage in.262 It is therefore instructive to examine how
administrative law treats ex parte communications when they arise in the
quasi-judicial context.
The APA provision governing adjudication is only triggered under
certain circumstances, where the legislature has intended hearings to be
conducted under formal, trial-like procedures.263 Once triggered, APA
adjudication requires an agency to follow specific processes.264 Among
these mandatory procedural protections is a provision prohibiting ex parte
communications on the merits in a proceeding between any interested
party and the agency (including intra-agency discussion).265
If any prohibited communications occur, then the APA requires the
communications—including written documents, summary of oral
contacts, and all responses made to ex parte communications—be placed
on the record.266 Additionally, the agency may require the party who made
a prohibited contact to demonstrate why his or her interest in the
proceeding should not be “dismissed, denied, disregarded, or otherwise
adversely affected.”267
When, however, prohibited communications are not disclosed, a
decision is not de facto invalid.268 Rather, undisclosed ex parte contacts
render the agency decision voidable.269 This is true even where an
adjudication was never required to follow APA procedures on grounds of
procedural due process.270 A reviewing court must decide whether the
“process was irrevocably tainted so as to make the ultimate judgment of
the agency unfair . . . .”271
To determine this, courts turn to the PATCO factors adopted by

262. See supra Parts I, II.
263. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2015) (“[I]n every case of adjudication required by statute to be
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing . . . .” (emphasis added)).
264. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–557 (2015). These provisions also apply to hearings conducted
pursuant to APA § 553, informally called formal rulemaking. Formal rulemaking is incredibly
rare, and beyond the scope of this Note. See id.; see also FUNK ET. AL., supra note 53, at 51.
265. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(A)–(B) (2015).
266. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(C) (2015).
267. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(D) (2015).
268. See Prof’l Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Fed. Labor Relations Authority, 685 F.2d
547, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“In sum, Congress sought to establish common-sense guidelines to
govern ex parte [sic] contacts in administrative hearings, rather than rigidly defined and
woodenly applied rules.”).
269. Id. at 564.
270. See supra Section III. Cases arising from non-APA adjudications have revolved
around whether ex parte communications were “so substantial and so likely to cause prejudice”
that the resulting decision cannot stand. Stone v. FDIC, 179 F.3d 1368, 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (dismissing government’s argument for a test requiring proof of contacted official’s
subjective intent).
271. PATCO, 685 F.2d at 564.
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Florida in Jennings,272 weighing (1) the seriousness of the contacts; (2) the
effect of the contacts on the ultimate decision; (3) the beneficiary of the
action and whether he or she made the contacts; (4) if the communications
were not merely undisclosed, but unknown to the other party; and (5)
whether remand would have any meaningful effect.273 Taken together,
these factors implicate a fact-heavy analysis of situations on a case-bycase basis. They consider both objective factors—what is the decision,
and how does it appear in light of ex parte communications—and
subjective ones: what does it seem the administrative tribunal took from
these communications?274
This standard is identical to the one briefly adopted by Florida
(without a stated presumption of bias),275 and bears significant similarities
to the appearance of fairness doctrine as well.276 Additionally, it fills gaps
left by Idaho’s limited rule while avoiding the draconian proof
requirements seen in Oregon.277 The law surrounding the doctrine is much
further developed than that seen in the states. As discussion infra will
address, the administrative solution to ex parte communications in quasijudicial determinations presents a compelling starting point for any
potential model rule.
VI. A MODEL PROPOSAL: STANDARDIZING, YET AVOIDING, JUDICIAL
REVIEW
Taking into consideration the solutions proposed by both the states278
and the Federal Government,279 the first step of a solution is eminently
clear: any state addressing the issue of ex parte communications in a
quasi-judicial context should adopt a disclosure requirement. Every
authority that has tackled the issue has, in some way, utilized the
mechanism.280

272. Jennings v. Dade Cty., 589 So. 2d 1337, 1341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (citing
PATCO, 685 F.2d at 564–65); see supra Section IV.D.
273. PATCO, 685 F.2d at 564–65.
274. The PATCO court’s balancing test is compatible with the fact-specific inquiry into
whether ex parte communications were so susceptible to creating bias that the decision cannot
stand set out in Stone. Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377.
275. See supra Section IV.D.
276. See supra Section IV.E.
277. Compare supra Section IV.C, with supra Section IV.B.
278. See supra Part IV.
279. See supra Part V.
280. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(C) (2015) (mandating disclosure subject to sanctions);
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.36.060 (2015) (requiring disclosure, otherwise triggering appearance
of fairness doctrine); OR. REV. STAT. § 215.422(3) (2015) (allowing for disclosure to quell
potential issues); see also Idaho Historic Pres. Council, Inc. v. City Council of Boise, 8 P.3d
646, 649 (Idaho 2000) (noting disclosure may have led to different holding); Jennings v. Dade
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There is no doubt that quasi-judicial proceedings implicate due
process, and ex parte communications present possible due process
violations.281 Applying the Mathews test for particular due process
procedures,282 it is evident that disclosure is required. First, there are some
of the most essential private interests at issue in municipal board hearings:
property, liberty, and the resulting procedural right to a fair hearing before
a fair tribunal.283 The measure would cost the government nothing, and
both increase public faith in municipal boards while simultaneously
preventing the expense of potential litigation, as any cause of action would
be moot.284 Finally, disclosing ex parte communications on the record
cures any possible erroneous deprivation that would result from their
existence by giving parties an opportunity to rebut their content.285
Required disclosure alone is not enough, as it does not provide for
what should happen when contacts are not disclosed. Another great
strength of the APA is its explicit balancing test for weighing the
prejudicial effect of undisclosed ex parte contacts.286 Allowing for a factbased determination of the actual prejudicial effect of such contacts 287
without requiring absolute proof that the contacts resulted in prejudice
provides plaintiffs more latitude in proving their claims. 288 At the same
time, such a test prevents potentially over-reactive de facto invalidation,289
and prevents situations that may appear unfair, but in fact are completely
above-board from being exploited.290
Still, the PATCO factors291 leave one major gap in coverage: what
happens to plaintiffs who can only demonstrate persistent, subtle
influence?292 In a situation such as Cernak, where a plaintiff can show a

Cty., 589 So. 2d 1337, 1341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (requiring disclosure, although even
disclosed ex parte communications opened action to invalidation).
281. See supra Part II.
282. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
283. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255
(1970).
284. See, e.g., Tierney v. Duris, 536 P.2d 435, 443 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that
disclosed ex parte communications did not implicate due process).
285. Cf. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (holding that pre-deprivation hearing would be no
more effective at preventing erroneous deprivation than a post-deprivation hearing).
286. See Prof’l Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 685 F.2d 547,
564–65 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
287. Id. at 564–65.
288. Cf. Neuberger v. Portland, 607 P.2d 722, 725 (Or. 1980).
289. Of the kind feared after Idaho Historic Pres. Council, Inc. v. City Council of Boise,
8 P.3d 646 (Idaho 2000).
290. See Van Noy, supra note 237, at 564.
291. See PATCO, 685 F.2d at 564–65. The PATCO factors are mostly concerned with
communications that are apparently prejudicial—weighty communications with a demonstrable
effect on the deciding body’s decision. Id.
292. See, e.g., Cernak Memorandum, supra note 6.
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pattern of the relatively mundane contacts being continuously made to
make relations friendlier, that person must still prove a prejudicial effect
from them—none of the PATCO factors would provide recourse.293
However, psychological studies indicate that those communications—
already recognized as problematic and prohibited—can have substantial
effect on a board member’s decision.294
This issue can be resolved with the Jennings presumption, which
shone brightly and briefly in Florida in the early 1990s.295 By presuming
bias upon the showing of undisclosed ex parte communications,296 courts
can recognize those subtler forms of bias that result from repetition,
familiarity, and availability.297 Presumptions have four general functions:
(1) to place a burden where it is most likely to be carried—that is, with the
party who can best access proof; (2) to put into effect substantive policy
choices; (3) to recognize what is probably true; and (4) to allow for proof
where it may be impossible.298
Presumptions are common throughout America’s civil
courtrooms.299 In a situation such as this, bias from undisclosed ex parte
communications may be incredibly hard to prove for a plaintiff, and the
defendant board will have the best access to proof of the communications’
effects.300
Additionally, given the strong potential of ex parte
communications to bear on well-established cognitive biases, a
presumption would recognize a probable truth of some quantum of bias.301
Like the presumption instituted in Jennings, this presumption would
be far from conclusive. While not so weak that the slightest quantum of
evidence presented against the presumption would defeat it,302 the
293. See PATCO, 685 F.2d at 564–65. The gravity of the contacts is low; they did not
bear on material matters; it is hard to say the decision of the ZBA relied on them. See Cernak
v. Planning Bd. for the City of Easthampton, No. 10-035, *4–6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Hampshire
Cty., Mar. 26, 2013) (on file with author).
294. See supra Section III.A.
295. Jennings v. Dade Cty., 589 So. 2d 1337, 1344–45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(Barkdull, J., concurring).
296. Cf. id. at 1341. Jennings would have invoked its presumption upon the showing of
any ex parte communications. Id. This Note proposes removing that automatic trigger, as it
does not seem to serve a useful purpose—if contacts are disclosed, there is fair opportunity for
rebuttal and counter-persuasion.
297. See Zajonc, supra note 102, at 224; Schwarz et. al., supra note 97, at 200–01; Swap,
supra note 105, at 248.
298. CHRISTOPHER R. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 116 (5th ed.
2012).
299. Id. at 117. In fact, there are so many that creating an exhaustive list is impractical
and unhelpful. Id.
300. See, e.g., Cernak Memorandum, supra note 6, at *20–23 (discussing ZBA testimony
on the effects of communications).
301. See supra Section III.A.
302. See generally Cappuccio v. Prime Capital Funding, LLC, 649 F.3d 180 (3d Cir.
2011) (discussing the “bursting bubble” presumptions). Bursting bubble presumptions take
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presumption of bias would only serve to give the plaintiff some proof to
build upon in persuading the jurors or bench of a PATCO/Jennings-factor
impact.303 This balance would still favor the board—assuming there was
in fact no bias, and the communications were indeed harmless, a plaintiff
could not win on the presumption alone.
A disclosure requirement is a common-sense step in clearly
delineating the obligations of all parties to a quasi-judicial municipal
proceeding, as well as a stepping-off point for allowing judicial review of
those proceedings on the issue of ex parte communications. If ex parte
communications are disclosed—absent other procedural or substantive
defaults—there is no reason to institute judicial review. If, however, they
are left hidden, courts should assume they had a prejudicial effect, until
persuaded otherwise. This regime strikes the proper balance between
respecting the due process rights of citizens and leaving their municipal
boards with a manageable standard.
CONCLUSION
By the very nature of procedural due process doctrine, any issue that
potentially violates its guarantees is fraught with inconsistency and
confusion. However, this is not prohibitive in establishing safeguards for
those who seek its protections in quasi-judicial municipal proceedings.
There is no doubt ex parte communications present serious risks of
bias and determinations made on facts that are not included in the
record.304 Sufficient case law has developed around attempts to combat
these risks to demonstrate what works, and what does not. Under a rule
requiring absolute proof of bias, plaintiffs who demonstrate circumstantial
evidence of a cash-for-votes scheme (such as those in 1000 Friends) are
left in the cold.305 Under a rule rendering ex parte communications de
facto due process violations, harmless—even accidental—contacts could
leave a municipal board unable to function.306
As with any measure of procedural due process, the proposal must
balance the governmental and individual interests, along with the effect

only the slightest rebuttal to disappear. In this context, mere testimony by board members that
ex parte communications had no effect would erase the presumption, and leave plaintiffs
without any proof, defeating the purpose of a presumption altogether. See MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 298, at 122–23.
303. See id. at 123–24. Where no evidence either mandating a finding for the
presumption or against it is available, the parties are left to persuasion on whatever evidence
there is. Id.
304. See supra Parts II, III, V.
305. See supra Section IV.B.
306. See supra Section IV.C.
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on the risk of erroneous deprivation.307 Allowing for initial disclosure of
ex parte communications to cure subsequent issues—an act that is easy
for the government, protects the strong individual rights in play, and
removes risk of faulty outcome—places the ball firmly in the municipal
body’s court. If they fail to follow that clear, simple requirement, it is fair
to assume they did so for a reason, and presume them biased.308
At that point, the reasonable fact finder’s opinion will rule the day—
the county commissioner extorting constituents for above-market cattle
sales will be overturned; the ZBA member who speaks with a constituent
in passing about a grocery store will not be. Every interested party will
receive a procedure (on the municipal level and beyond) that is fact-based
and fundamentally fair.

307. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (discussing the due process
balancing test).
308. See supra Section IV.D, Part V, Part VI.

